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Thank you very much to the organizers here at the Kernochan Center and at the
Copyright Office for putting this together. This is always a terrific event and I'm
delighted to be here and really excited to have an opportunity to talk about a set of
issues that I think is really important. In some respects, what I'm going to do is push
on some of the things that Shyam Balganesh was just telling you about' and continue
to give you a bit of my sense of some of the challenges that conceptual art is facing
in the Copyright Office and that the Copyright Office is facing with respect to
conceptual art. I will use these issues as an opportunity to think about some more
fundamental challenges at the heart of copyright doctrine.
I'm interested in the way in which the control or predictability that some putative
author has over the content of her creation interacts with our judgments of its
creativity.2 What I'm going to suggest is that there's a paradox at the heart of
copyright law and that these cases involving conceptual art demonstrate that paradox
pretty clearly. In fact, though, the paradox actually exists in a variety of other cases.
Here's the basic argument: that to the extent that someone exerts too little control
or that there is too much unpredictability about the way in which the work will be
produced, then that person is at risk of being declared not an author of the work.
Copyright law looks for control and predictability, and if there's not enough of either,
then copyright law and the Copyright Office may conclude that the creator is not an
"author" of the work. On the other hand, to the extent that there is too much control
or too much predictability, then authors run the risk of being told that their work is
not creative. In fact, the strategy for an author is to balance these sorts of competing
requirements: to exert control over the ultimate product, but not so much control that
you risk losing the opportunity for creative expression.
By looking at a variety of cases, we can see how these issues have arisen.
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Copyright law has adopted from aesthetic theory a fairly traditional about the nature
of authorship and creativity, and over the course of the last fifty or sixty years,
conceptual art in particular has been challenging a lot of those theories, encouraging
us to think more deeply about what we understand authorship and creativity to be.
According to the contemporary aesthetic philosopher Paisley Livingston, to be an
author is to be in control of an "utterance." 3 Livingston and other philosophers have
tried to conceptualize who, with respect to some multi-person effort, can plausibly
be the author or authors of the work. Does the caterer of a film shoot count as one
of its authors? Does the financial backer of a film or a book count? The answer to
the rhetorical question is clearly "no!" An author is one who exerts authority over
how the work is made, who gets to contribute to it when it gets finished.
Similar disputes show up in copyright law regularly, when the law has to decide
who, if anyone, is an author of a given work. It looks for who has control over the
work and if one has insufficient control over the work, one risks being declared not
its author. Take, for example, Lindsay v. Titanic.' Lindsay directed an underwater
shoot of the Titanic vessel. The photos were the ones he directed people to shoot,
even though he himself did not dive down to take the photographs of the Titanic.
Nonetheless, the court had no problem describing him as the author. Why? Because
he exercised such a high degree of control that the film "duplicates his conceptions."
He had in his mind some set of ideas of how the (literally) underlying ship would be
expressed in the ultimate images that got produced, and those images duplicate his
conception, so he has control of them.
On the other hand, in the Andrien case,6 a less well known case, someone hired a
producer to print off a bunch of maps, among other things. And then the printer tried
to claim a copyright as the author of the the ultimate production. However, according
to the court, the printer is effectively an amanuensis of the actual author. The author
is dictating what's happening, is in full control of how the work ultimately gets
produced, and thus the mere printer of the work can't assert any sort of authority
because she didn't do anything, and didn't have any control over the work.
This shows up in these conceptual art cases as well. In Kelley v. Chicago Park
District,' the artist Chapman Kelley installed an enormous wildflower garden in
Grant Park and brought suit under the Visual Artists Rights Act when the parks
department modified the garden without his permission. Part of the problem for
Kelley in the Seventh Circuit's opinion was that, at any given moment, the garden
owes most of its form and appearance not to Kelley-Kelley doesn't control it-but
to natural forces.8 Though the gardener who plants and tends obviously assists, he
but then gives away control-gives up the opportunity to perfectly prune the work
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and predict precisely how it's going to go. At any moment, he can't know what it
might look like. That is beyond his control, and in this respect, he becomes less of
an author of the work.
Contesting notions of authorial control is a regular feature of contemporary and
conceptual art. For instance, in Vito Acconci's film Following Piece,9 he would
wake up in the morning, grab a camera, and find a random person and follow them
on the streets until they went into a private establishment. Each film lasts however
long that person was walking publicly. He just kind of creepily walked behind them.
This becomes, in some respects-and this is the point-the total depersonalization
of the work. It is mechanical and irrational; it doesn't require the author to make
choices. And that's the goal for Acconci, but also part of the problem that it produces
when it potentially bumps up against copyright law.
Or consider Yayoi Kusama's ObliterationRoom.Io The room starts off white, and
then people are encouraged to put stickers on the walls, floor, and ceiling. By the
end of the day the room is covered in stickers. Here the artist, Kusama, doesn't have
control of the ultimate end product and, in that respect, runs into problems for
understanding her commitment to authorship and her ability to be described as the
ultimate author of the work.
Although copyright law requires authorial control, the other side of this problem
is that in order to be a copyright-protectedauthor, you have to exhibit some kind of
creativity. And what I'm going to suggest again is that what creativity is doing in
copyright law is mimicking what creativity means in a certain kind of traditional
aesthetic theory that does not line up well with contemporary artistic practice. Berys
Gaut, another aesthetic philosopher, says that a creative work is one that is original,
valuable, and demonstrates "flair."" I love that word. Feist's requirement that a
copyrightable work not only be independently created by the author, but also exhibit
"some minimal degree of creativity,"l2 is hard to interpret, and I think flair is a pretty
good word for what that second step is. We're looking for flair; it can't be made
purely by chance (that is to say, without control), and it also can't be made purely
mechanically or through rote procedure. There has to be an opportunity for
imagination.
So in copyright law too, it must be original and creative. This means that there
must be opportunities for freedom to choose, that the work reflects subjective
judgment and that there be some sort of unpredictable "spark" to the work. These
are the terms that Feist uses. These are the terms the Copyright Office uses. I
interpret these demands as a requirement of unpredictability: something that we
didn't see coming, some flair, something unusual, something more than garden
variety, and the like.
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One of the ways this gets cashed out in copyright law, in a way that I think is
interestingly problematic, is that at least some courts, and lots of copyright scholars
and thinkers, analyze creativity in a purely additive dimension-that creativity is
what you add to stuff. Take, for example, the Meshwerks case,1 3 in which then-Judge
Gorsuch declared a digital wireframe model to be insufficiently creative, a mere
slavish copy of a Toyota Camry. Gorsuch says that the model purely depicts the
vehicle. It is "untouched by a digital paintbrush" because the image doesn't, for
example, depict the car surrounded by palm trees or climbing a mountain road.' 4
Gorsuch seems to be requiring some sort of additive creativity; if Meshwerks had
added some palm trees in there, they would have a copyright. But I think what
Gorsuch fails to note is that the image doesn't look at all like a Camry. If you went
to the Toyota dealership and you said, "I would like to test drive the Canny," and
they showed you a wirefmme model of a Canny that you could see through, you'd
be pretty freaked out. You would not get in the car. I think what Gorsuch is failing
to recognize is the way in which an important part of the aesthetic and creative
process is not purely additive, but in fact abstractive or subtractive as well.
On the other hand, take the Schrock case, in which the author made photographs
of a set of "Thomas the Tank Engine and Friends" toys.'" This case succeeds for the
author. Why? Because he's able to tell a story about the way in which there's
something special about these photographs of them that doesn't exist in the toys as
such-he made them look super happy, happier than they already were. If you can
tell a story about additive creativity, then you can succeed, but if your story is merely
abstractive creativity, I think authors' claims to copyright have a harder time.
Consider two more examples. First, a work of art called Glazed Maple, which is
actually a linoleum floor tile.'" This looks like a floor tile to me-a piece of wood.
But that was not what the plaintiffs in the case claimed when they asserted copyright
in GlazedMaple. They claimed that they looked at a lot of wood and got a bunch of
ideas about wood-but that the work was not any particular piece of wood that has
ever existed, but rather an expression of their ideas of "glazed maple." So here what
they were doing was thinking hard about what maple should look like and then
demonstrating it with this piece of wood that looks like what maple should like. And
there the court says, effectively, "Yeah, you guys did a lot of stuff; that's really
creative."
By contrast, a work like Log Cabin,"when the author, Cady Noland, is engaging
in subtractive, abstractive creativity, I think it becomes harder to see the nature of the
creativity involved in the production. Here, the author doesn't seem to want to tell a
story about "I thought about log cabins and all of these dreams about log cabins came
to me and this is what I produced." When the author doesn't want to tell that storysometimes for aesthetic reasons, sometimes for market-based reasons-then the
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ultimate copyright comes into doubt.
One of the great writers on conceptual art, Sol LeWitt, wrote that "[w]hen an artist
uses a conceptual form of art . .. the execution is a perfunctory affair.""' The whole
point is that the concept or the idea eliminates the arbitrary, capricious, and subjective
as much as possible. When it comes to something like Deborah Kass's OY/YO
sculpture,' 9 that's exactly the point in many respects. It's to limit the subjectivity
and creativity of the artist, but that itself is a creative contribution.
Going back to Shyam's suggestion with respect to Sarony, 0 Sarony gets a lot of
credit for asserting control over his photograph of Oscar Wilde. And who gets little
credit? Certainly, Sarony's mechanic. (In the 1870s and 1880s, he was called a
mechanic, not a photographer.) But also, Wilde, and more importantly, Wilde's
barber. Wilde took his barber to the Metropolitan Museum of Art (this was taken in
New York) to look at the classical sculptures in the museum and to make sure his
hair looked exactly like that. As we think about who has control over that work, I
think Wilde and his barber miss out on those claims, although I think they may matter
in important ways.
I hope that understanding this challenge between control and creativity will give
us some purchase on analyzing the questions associated with Slater and monkey
selfies, 21 and will give us some purchase on analyzing the questions associated with
Al and computer code and the sorts of creativity that come about in those sorts of
ways as well.
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